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Abstract
Though deep learning has been applied successfully in many scenarios, malicious
inputs with human-imperceptible perturbations can make it vulnerable in real ap-
plications. This paper proposes an error-correcting neural network (ECNN) that
combines a set of binary classifiers to combat adversarial examples in the multi-
class classification problem. To build an ECNN, we propose to design a code ma-
trix so that the minimumHamming distance between any two rows (i.e., two code-
words) and the minimum shared information distance between any two columns
(i.e., two partitions of class labels) are simultaneously maximized. Maximizing
row distances can increase the system fault tolerance while maximizing column
distances helps increase the diversity between binary classifiers. We propose an
end-to-end training method for our ECNN, which allows further improvement of
the diversity between binary classifiers. The end-to-end training renders our pro-
posed ECNN different from the traditional error-correcting output code (ECOC)
based methods that train binary classifiers independently. We empirically demon-
strate that our proposed ECNN is effective against the state-of-the-art white-box
attacks while maintaining good classification accuracy on normal examples.
1 Introduction
Deep learning has beenwidely and successfully applied in many tasks such as image classification [1,
2], speech recognition [3], and natural language processing [4]. However, recent works [5] showed
that the original images can be modified by an adversary with human-imperceptible perturbations
so that the deep neural networks (DNNs) are fooled into mis-classifying them.
To mitigate the effect of adversarial attacks, many defense approaches have been proposed. Gener-
ally speaking, they fall into three categories:
1. adversarial training, which augments the training data with adversarial examples [5, 6],
2. modifying the DNN or training procedure, e.g., defensive distillation [7], and
3. post-training defenses, which attempt to remove the adversarial noise from the input exam-
ples [8–10] in the testing phase.
In this paper, we propose an approach for the second category. Most defense approaches of this type
focus on robustifying a single network, while a few works have adopted ensemble methods [11–14].
These ensemble methods build a new classifier consisting of several base classifiers that are assigned
with the same classification task. Promoting the diversity among the base classifiers during training
is essential to prevent adversarial examples from transferring between them, since the adversarial
examples crafted for one classifier may also fool the others.
The use of error correcting output codes (ECOC) [15, 16] differs from the abovementioned ensemble
methods by assigning each class an unique codeword. This forms a pre-defined code matrix. For
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an illustration, see Table 1, which shows an example of a code matrix for three classes with each
class being represented by four bits. Each column splits the original classes into two meta-classes,
meta-class ‘0’ and meta-class ‘1’. A binary classifier is then learned independently for each column
of the code matrix. To classify a new sample, all binary classifiers are evaluated to obtain a binary
string. Finally, the method assigns the class whose codeword is closest to the obtained binary string
to the sample. In the literature, ECOC is mostly used with decision trees or shallow neural networks.
Table 1: Example of a 3× 4 code matrix.
Class Net 0 Net 1 Net 2 Net 3
0 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 1
2 0 0 0 1
In this paper, we utilize the concept of ECOC in a deep neural network, which we call error-
correcting neural network (ECNN). In traditional ECOC, a code matrix is generated in such a way
that the minimum Hamming distance between any two rows is maximized. Maximizing the row dis-
tance creates sufficient redundant error-correcting bits, thus enhancing the classifier’s error-tolerant
ability. However, it is possible for an adversary to design adversarial examples that trick most of the
binary classifiers since they are not fully independent of each other. Therefore, to mitigate this effect,
the code matrix should be designed so that the binary tasks are as different from each other as pos-
sible. When designing a code matrix for ECNN, we attempt to separate columns (binary tasks) by
maximizing the minimum shared information distance [17] between any two columns. Maximizing
the column distance inherently promotes the diversity between binary classifiers. This is essential
to prevent the adversarial examples crafted for one binary classifier transferring to the other binary
classifiers.
After our preliminary work,2 we became aware of a recent independent work [18], which designs
a DNN using error-correcting codes and shares similar concepts with our proposed approach. The
main difference to our work is that our encoder, i.e., all the binary classifiers, and the decoder in
our proposed ECNN are trained jointly whereas [18] splits the binary classifiers into several groups,
with each being trained separately. The work [18] only forces a pre-training diversity using its
code matrix whereas ECNN further includes a diversity promoting regularizer during training. This
novelty improves the testing accuracy of ECNN compared to [18].
During training of ECNN, all binary classifiers are jointly trained and their outputs, i.e., the predicted
meta-class classification probabilities, are concatenated and fed into a decoder to obtain the predicted
classification probabilities. We propose an end-to-end training method that allows for exploiting the
interaction between binary classifiers, thus further improving the diversity between them. Our main
contributions are summarized as follows:
1. We apply error-correcting codes to build a DNN for classification and propose an end-to-
end training method. For illustration, we focus our discussion on the problem of robust
image classification.
2. We provide theoretical analysis that helps to guide the design of ECNN, including the
choice of activation functions.
3. In our experiments, we test ECNN on two widely used datasets MNIST [19] and CIFAR-10
[20] under several well-known adversarial attacks. We demonstrate empirically that ECNN
is robust against adversarial white-box attacks with improvement in classification accuracy
of adversarial examples of up to 14.8 and 17.4 percentage points compared to another
current state-of-the-art ensemble method [18] onMNIST and CIFAR10, respectively, while
ECNN uses 22.2% more parameters than [18] on MNIST and 78.8% less parameters than
[18] on CIFAR10.
Furthermore, we show how to generalize the binary classifiers used in ECNN to q-ary classifiers
using a q-ary code matrix.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our ECNN framework, its
training strategy and some theoretical analysis of its properties. In Section 3, we present extensive
experimental results, and we conclude in Section 4. We refer interested readers to the Appendix A
for a more detailed account of several recent works that defend against adversarial examples using
ensembles of models [11–13, 18, 14] and some popular adversarial attacks [6, 21–24] that are used
to verify the robustness of our proposed ECNN. The proofs for all lemmas in this paper are given in
the Appendix B - Appendix F.
2 Error-Correcting Neural Network
In this section, we present the architectures of the encoder and the decoder in ECNN, the training
strategy and the way to generate the code matrix. We provide theoretical results that help to guide
us in the design of ECNN. Finally, we show how to extend to q-ary classifiers in the encoder, where
q > 2.
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Fig. 1: ECNN architecture.
The overall architecture of ECNN is shown in Fig. 1. Consider aM -ary classification problem. As
described in Section 1, a M × N binary code matrix M, where N ≥ 1, encodes each class with a
N -bit codeword. For each n = 0, . . . , N − 1, the n-th bits of all theM codewords define a binary
meta-classification problem. For example, in the code matrix shown in Table 1, the first bits or “Net
0” as indicated in the table correspond to a binary classification problem that distinguishes classes
1 or 2 from class 3. We learn a binary classifier corresponding to each binary meta-classification
problem and combine their outputs together. The collection of these binary classifiers is called the
encoder in our architecture. We call each binary classifier in the encoder a meta classifier. The
encoder is then followed by a decoder whose function is to infer which of theM classes the sample
belongs to. In the following, we describe both the encoder and decoder in detail. Let y(x) be the
label of sample x. We suppose that a training set {(xk, y(xk)) : k = 0, . . . ,K − 1} is available.
In our discussions, we append a subscript xk to a quantity (e.g., fn,xk in place of fn) if we wish to
emphasize its dependence on the sample xk.
2.1 Encoder
The encoder containsN composite functions σ◦hn ◦gθn , for n = 0, . . . , N−1, each corresponding
to a binary classifier. The function gθn extract feature vectors fn = gθn(x) ∈ R
F from the input x,
hn is a prediction function that outputs zn = hn(fn) ∈ R1, which can be interpreted as probabilities
after normalization.
We choose hn to be a simple linear function, i.e., zn = φnfn, for n = 0, . . . , N−1. Furthermore, in
our final architecture, we setφn = φ for all n = 0, . . . , N−1. The reason for our choice is explained
later in the next subsection where we introduce the concept of ensemble diversity. Denote the loss
function for the encoder as ℓ(zn,M(y(x), n)). The encoder can be formulated as an optimization
problem:
min
{θn,φn}
N−1
n=0
1
NK
K−1∑
k=0
N−1∑
n=0
ℓ(zn,xk ,M(y(xk), n)) (1)
s.t. for k = 0, . . . ,K − 1 and n = 0, . . . , N − 1,
zn,xk = φngθn(xk),
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whereM ∈ {0, 1}M×N is the given code matrix withM(y(x), n) being the (y(x), n)-th element in
M. The loss function ℓ(zn,M(y(x), n)) would be
ℓ(zn,M(y(x), n)) =
{
max(0, 1− zn(2M(y, n)− 1)), for hinge loss,
−1⊺yn log (ζn) , for cross entropy loss,
(2)
where yn(x) = M(y(x), n), 1yn(x) is the one-hot encoding of the meta-class yn(x), i.e., a vector
with 1 at the yn(x)-th entry and 0 for all the other entries and ζn = [1 − ν(zn), ν(zn)]⊺ with ν(·)
being the logistic function. Finally, the logits zn are concatenated into z = [z0, . . . , zN−1]
⊺, which
is the input to the decoder in ECNN.
2.2 Ensemble Diversity
To mitigate against adversarial attacks, each feature vector fn, n = 0, . . . , N − 1, should only be
instrumental in its own binary classifier’s prediction while being insensitive to the other binary clas-
sifiers’ predictions. However, it is difficult to directly define a difference measurement between
features. One possible way is to ensure linear independence between them and measure the inde-
pendence using singular values. This operation is computationally costly, making it unsuitable for
training in neural networks. Furthermore, even if feature vectors are linearly independent, it may
very well happen that fi is just a permutation of fj for i 6= j. The use of Lp distance to measure
differences in feature vectors is therefore inappropriate. We choose to promote ensemble diversity
in terms of the output probability of each binary classifier by solving the following optimization
problem:
max
{φi}
N−1
i=0
1
NK
K−1∑
k=0
∑
i6=j
− [1− ν (φifj,xk) , ν (φifj,xk)] log ([1− ν (φifj,xk) , ν (φifj,xk)]
⊺
) , (3)
s.t. fj,xk = gθj(xk), j = 0, . . . , N − 1, k = 0, . . . ,K − 1.
Assuming that the input x is drawn from a distribution, let fyn be the expected feature vector of class
y generated by the n-th classifier in the encoder. We call this the principal feature vector of class y.
Then for any input x, we have
fn,x = f
y(x)
n + ǫn,x, (4)
where ǫn,x is a zero-mean random perturbation. We make the following assumption.
Assumption 1. The random vectors {ǫn,xk : k = 0, . . . ,K−1} have a joint distribution absolutely
continuous with respect to (w.r.t.) Lebesgue measure.
The above assumption is satisfied if the training samples {xk : k = 0, . . . ,K − 1} are drawn inde-
pendent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) from a distribution absolutely continuous w.r.t. Lebesgue
measure.
Lemma 1. Suppose that {θn}
N−1
n=0 satisfy Assumption 1. Then the following statements hold with
probability one:
(a) Suppose θn = θ for all n = 0, . . . , N − 1. There exists {φn : n = 0, . . . , N − 1} such that
the loss of (1) is arbitrarily small ifK ≤ F .
(b) Suppose φn = φ for all n = 0, . . . , N − 1. There exists a φ such that the loss of (1) is
arbitrarily small if NK ≤ F .
(c) SupposeN > 1. Any feasible solution of (1) cannot have θn = θ and φn = φ for some θ
and φ, and for all n = 0, . . . , N − 1.
Lemma 2. Suppose that {θn}
N−1
n=0 satisfy Assumption 1. Suppose further that {θn}
N−1
n=0 are chosen
so that for each n = 0, . . . , N − 1 and y = 0, . . . ,M − 1, fyn = Snf
y for some fy ∈ RF , where Sn
is a permutation matrix.
(a) There exist linear transformations {φn}
N−1
n=0 such that the loss of (1) is arbitrarily small.
(b) IfNM ≥ F (M +1) andφn are constrained to be the same for all n = 0, . . . , N −1, then
for almost every (w.r.t. Lebesgue measure) {fy}M−1y=0 , there is no feasible solution to (1).
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Lemma 3. Suppose that {θn}
N−1
n=0 satisfy Assumption 1, and {f
y
n : y = 0, . . . ,M − 1, n =
0, . . . , N − 1} are linearly independent. For all n = 0, . . . , N − 1, φn are constrained to be
the same. Then, the n-th binary classifier in the encoder classifies the sample xk, k = 0, . . . ,K − 1,
correctly if ‖ǫn,xk‖2 is sufficiently small.
Lemma 1 shows that if we constrain either the parameters θn or transforms φn (but not both) in the
encoder to be identical across binary classifiers, then it is still possible to achieve arbitrarily small
loss. Lemma 2 suggests that if we do not constrain the transformsφn to be the same, then optimizing
(1) may produce a solution where the features fy(x)n for different binary classifiers n = 0, . . . , N − 1
are permutations of each other for the same sample x. This is clearly undesirable as any adversarial
attack on a particular binary classifier can then translate to the other classifiers. On the other hand,
Lemma 3 suggests that if we constrain the transformsφn to be the same, and choose the parameters
θn to make {fyn : y = 0, . . . ,M−1, n = 0, . . . , N−1} linearly independent, then high classification
accuracy is still achievable if the input sample does not deviate too much from the norm. Our results
thus suggest that a good strategy is to share the transformφ across all the prediction functions. Then,
(3) becomes
max
φ
1
NK
K−1∑
k=0
N−1∑
n=0
−ζ⊺n,xk log(ζn,xk), (5)
s.t. for n = 0, . . . , N − 1, k = 0, . . . ,K − 1,
ζn,xk = [1− ν (φfn,xk) , ν (φfn,xk)]
⊺
, fn,xk = gθn(xk).
2.3 Decoder
The decoder is a composite function σ ◦ w. The function w first scales the logits z to [−1, 1] using
tanh function and then computes the inner products between the scaled logits and each row in
2M − 1, i.e., s = w(tanh(z)) = (2M − 1) tanh(z) ∈ RM , where 1 denotes a matrix with all
its entries being 1. The σ(·) is the softmax function which maps s to the prediction probabilities
p = σ ((2M− 1) tanh(z)) ∈ RM .
2.4 Joint Optimization
The joint optimization that combines (1) and (5) can be formulated as
min
{θn}
N−1
n=0 ,φ
1
NK
K−1∑
k=0
N−1∑
n=0
ℓ(zn,xk ,M(y(xk), n))− γζn,xk log (ζn,xk) , (6)
s.t. for n = 0, . . . , N − 1, k = 0, . . . ,K − 1,
zn,xk = φgθn(xk), (7)
where γ ≥ 0 is a configurable weight. The joint optimization (6) enables end-to-end training for
ECNN.
Note that if we use cross entropy for ℓ(zn,M(y(x), n)), we convert one-hot labels 1yn(xk) to soft
labels 1yn(xk) − γζn,xk for all n, k by optimizing (6). This is also known as label smoothing [25],
which is beneficial in improving the adversarial robustness in ECNN. The following Lemma 4 guides
us in the choice of γ given the smoothed probabilities {ζn,xk(yn(xk)) : n = 0, . . . , N − 1, k =
0, . . . ,K − 1}.
Lemma 4. The optimal solution of (6), where we use cross entropy for ℓ(zn,M(y(x), n)), satisfies
1
ζn,xk (yn(xk))
= γ log
ζn,xk(yn(xk))
1−ζn,xk (yn(xk))
for all n = 0, . . . , N − 1, k = 0, . . . ,K − 1.
2.5 Code Matrix Design
Let ri be the i-th codeword of code matrix M, and H(ri, rj) be the Hamming distance between
the i-th and j-th codewords of the code matrix, i.e., the number of bit positions where they differ.
The minimum Hamming distance of code matrix M is then given by dH(M) = mini6=j H(ri, rj).
A code matrix with larger dH(M) is preferred since it can correct more errors, resulting in better
classification performance. However, if we only consider maximizing dH(M) when designing M,
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the two columns of the matrix may lead to the corresponding binary classifiers performing the same
classification task even though they have different bits. For a concrete illustration, consider again the
code matrix example in Table 1. The last two columns in Table 1 are different, while the correspond-
ing “Net 2” and “Net 3” are essentially performing the same task: classifying the classes to set {0}
or {1, 2}. An adversarial example generated by an untargeted attack that fools “Net 2” will also fool
“Net 3”. To further promote the diversity between binary classifiers, we therefore include column
diversity when designing the code matrix. Specifically, we view each column of the code matrix
as partitioning theM classes into clusters, and measure the difference between two columns using
the variation of information (VI) metric [17]. VI, which is a criterion for comparing the difference
between two q-ary partitions, measures the amount of information lost and gained in changing from
one clustering to another clustering [17]. Each column of the ECNN code matrix can be interpreted
to be a binary cluster. We denote the m-th column of code matrix M as cm, a set of classes that
belong to meta-class k in them-th column as Ckm, wherem = 0, . . . , N − 1 and k = 0, 1. The VI
distance defined in [17] between cm and cn is
VI(cm, cn) =−
1∑
k=0
sm(k) log sm(k)−
1∑
k′=0
sn(k
′) log sn(k
′)
− 2
1∑
k=0
1∑
k′=0
sm,n(k, k
′) log
sm,n(k, k
′)
sm(k)sn(k′)
, (8)
where sm,n(k, k′) =
∣
∣
∣C
k
m∩C
k′
n
∣
∣
∣
M
, sm(k) =
|Ckm|
M
, sn(k′) =
∣
∣
∣C
k′
n
∣
∣
∣
M
, and |A| denotes the cardi-
nality of the set A. The minimum VI distance of code matrix M is then given by dVI(M) =
minm 6=nVI(cm, cn).
The code matrix is designed tomaxM dH(M)+dVI(M), which is however a NP-complete problem
[26]. We adopt simulated annealing [27, 28] to solve this optimization problem heuristically, where
the energy function is set as:
min
M
∑
i6=j
H(ri, rj)
−2 + η
∑
m 6=n
VI(cm, cn)
−2, (9)
and η is chosen such that the two summations are roughly equally weighted. This is a common
technique used in simulated annealing [28] because bit changes not involving the minimum distance
pairs would not be reflected in the energy function if it is set asmaxM dH(M) + dVI(M).
2.6 q-ary ECNN
A natural extension is to use a general q-ary code matrix with each meta classifier performing a q-ary
classification problem. Since max dH(M) for a q-ary M is no less than max dH(M) for a binary
M, using a q-ary M with q > 2 has better error-correcting capacity than using a binaryM. Hence,
better classification accuracy on normal images is expected as q increases. On the other hand, we
show in Lemma 5 below that more information about the original classes is revealed in each q-ary
classifier as q increases, thus rendering less adversarial robustness.
Lemma 5. Suppose y = [0, . . . ,M − 1]⊺ and c is a column of a q-ary code matrix M. The mutual
information between y and c can be defined, analogously to (8), as
I(y, c) =
q−1∑
k=0
M−1∑
ℓ=0
s(k, ℓ) log
s(k, ℓ)
s(k)s(ℓ)
, (10)
where s(k, ℓ) =
|Ck∩{ℓ}|
M
, s(k) =
|Ck|
M
with Ck being the set of meta-classes in c, and s(ℓ) =
|{ℓ}|
M
= 1
M
that belong to meta-class k. Then,maxc I(y, c) is an increasing function of q.
The training process of a q-ary ECNN is the same as that of a binary ECNN introduced in the
previous sections except that during training the encoder of a q-ary ECNN outputs q bits, i.e., zn ∈
R
q, n = 0, . . . , N − 1. To decode, we may convert the q-ary code matrixM into its binary version
and then apply the decoding processing introduced in Section 2.3 to decode. For more details about
q-ary ECNN implementation and experiments, please refer to the Appendix G and Appendix H.
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3 Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the robustness of ECNN under the adversarial attacks with different at-
tack parameters. The details of these adversarial attacks are provided in the Appendix H. We also
discuss some recently developed ensemble methods in the Appendix A.1, among which we experi-
mentally compare our proposed ECNN with 1) the ECOC-based DNN proposed in [18] as it shares a
similar concept as ours and 2) ADP-based ensemble method proposed in [13] as it is the only method
among the aforementioned ones that trains the ensemble in an end-to-end fashion. Another reason
for choosing these two methods as baseline benchmarks is their reported classification accuracies
under adversarial attacks are generally better than the other ensemble methods. More experimental
results can be found in Appendix H.
3.1 Setup
We test on two standard datasets: MNIST [2] and CIFAR10 [29]. For the encoder of ECNN, we
constrain hn = h for n = 0, . . . , N − 1. The reason for doing this is explained in Section 2.2 and is
further verified in the AppendixC. Furthermore, we constrain gθn = g
{2}
n ◦g{1} for n = 0, . . . , N−1
so that each composite function becomes h ◦ g{2}n ◦ g{1}. We use ResNet20 [30] to construct
h◦g
{2}
n ◦g{1}. To recap, ResNet20 consists of three stacks of residual units where each stack contains
three residual units, so there are nine residual units in ResNet20. With the intent of maintaining low
computational complexity, we construct the shared feature extraction function g{1} using the first
eight residual units in ResNet20 while leaving the last one to g{2}. The shared prediction function
h is a simple Dense layer. The detailed structure of ECNN is available in the Appendix H. In the
following, we use ECNNNγ to denote an ECNN, trained using a trade-off parameter γ used in (6),
with N binary classifiers. In all our result tables, bold indicates the best performer in a particular
row.
3.2 Performance Under White-box Attacks
White-box adversaries have knowledge of the classifier models, including training data, model archi-
tectures and parameters. We test the performance of ECNN in defending against white-box attacks.
Table 2 gives the parameters for different attack methods. The subsequent experiments use these
settings by default, unless otherwise stated.
Table 2: Parameters of attack methods for different datasets
Attack Para. MNIST CIFAR10
PGD[22] iteration size 1000 200
step size 0.05 0.02
JSMA[23] θ 1
C&W[24], BSA[31]
batch size 100
learning rate 1e-3
binary search step 10
We compare ECNN with two state-of-the-art ensemble methods:
(a) The adaptive diversity promoting (ADP) ensemble model, proposed by [13], for which we
use the same architecture and model parameters as reported therein. Specifically, we use
ADP2,0.5 with three ResNet20s being its meta classifiers. Note that the optimal solution
of ADP is attained when M − 1 is divisible by the number of base classifiers N . For
M = 10, usingN = 3 is optimal for ADP and increasingN beyond that does not improve
its performance.
(b) The ECOC-based neural network proposed by [18]. We choose the most robust model
named TanhEns16 reported therein, which stands for an ensemble model where the tanh
function is applied element-wise to the logits, and a Hadamard matrix of order 16 is used.
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As reported in [18], the TanhEns16 splits the whole network into four independent subnets
and each outputs 4-bit codeword.
When generating adversarial examples, as pointed out by [32] there are some precautions that should
be taken: 1) at the decoder, we avoid taking the log of the logits before feeding them into the softmax
function because taking log is numerically unstable, which leads to weak adversarial examples, and
2) we replace the softmax cross entropy loss function in PGD attack with the hinge loss proposed
by [24] in order to stabilize the process of crafting adversarial examples.
The classification results on MNIST are shown in Table 3. We can see that while maintaining
the state-of-the-art accuracy on normal images, ECNN300.1 improves the adversarial robustness as
compared to the other two methods. For the most effective attack in this experiment, i.e., PGD
attack, ECNN shows a 88.4%−79.2% = 9.2% improvement over TanhEns16 and a 88.4%−0.2% =
88.2% improvement overADP2,0.5. In terms of the number of trainable parameters, ECNN
16
0.1 uses
490,209−401,168
401,168 = 22.2% more parameters than TanhEns16 and
818,334−490,209
818,334 = 40.1% less than
ADP2,0.5.
Table 3: Classification accuracy (%) on adversarial MNIST examples.
Attack Para. ADP2,0.5 TanhEns16 ECNN
30
0.1
None - 99.7 99.5 99.4
PGD ǫ = 0.3 0.2 79.2 88.4
C&W - 87.1 97.0 99.4
BSA α = 0.8 51.0 95.0 99.3
JSMA γ = 0.6 1.6 84.2 99.0
# of trainable params - 818,334 401,168 490,209
For CIFAR10, we see from Table 4 that ADP2,0.5 has the best classification accuracy on clean
examples but it fails to make any reasonable predictions under adversarial attacks. This is mainly due
to the use of strong attack parameter settings. ECNN is consistently more robust than the competitors
under different adversarial attacks. In particular, ECNN300.1 achieves an absolute percentage point
improvement over ADP2,0.5 of up to 76.4% (for C&W) and over TanhEns16 of 8.5% (for PGD) to
17.4% (for BSA) for different attacks. Moreover, the number of trainable parameters used in ECNN
is 490,497819,198 = 59.88% of that used in ADP2,0.5 and
490,497
2,313,104 = 21.21% of that used in TanhEns16.
Table 4: Classification accuracy (%) on adversarial CIFAR10 examples.
Attack Para. ADP2,0.5 TanhEns16 ECNN
30
0.1
None - 93.4 87.5 85.1
PGD ǫ = 0.04 2.5 63.1 71.6
C&W - 4.4 68.0 80.8
BSA α = 0.8 4.3 61.3 78.7
JSMA γ = 0.2 15.8 68.2 84.2
# of trainable params 819,198 2,313,104 490,497
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a robust neural network ECNN that is inspired by error-correcting
codes and analyzed its properties. We provided an end-to-end training method. Designing a code
matrix by optimizing both the Hamming distance between rows and VI distance between columns
makes ECNN more robust against adversarial examples. We found that performing parameter shar-
ing at two ends of the ECNN’s encoder improves ensemble’s robustness while significantly reducing
8
the number of trainable parameters. Extensive experiments demonstrate that ECNN has superior
performance compared to current state-of-the-art ensemble methods while maintaining low compu-
tation complexity.
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Broader Impact
The existence of adversarial attacks threatens the practical applications of DNNs, which however
are tempting because of their state-of-the-art performance on many real tasks. Our work, which con-
tributes to more robust DNNs, is supposed to mitigate the threat of adversarial attacks. However, on
the other hand, the reliable deployment of DNNs in automation of tasks will potentially bring mass-
scale unemployment and social unrest. As DNNs become more robust and more tasks, especially
those whose failures will bring high risks to human lives or large property losses under adversarial
attacks, fall into the automatic task category, massive jobs could disappear. On the other hand, in
some cases, the use of adversarial attacks may help to protect personal privacy by fooling poten-
tially malicious data collectors with imperceptible perturbations added to the data. The robustness
we contribute to DNNs may make this kind of privacy protection less promising.
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A Related Work and Adversarial Attacks
In this section we brief more recent works that defend against adversarial examples using ensembles
of models [11–13, 18, 14] with more details. Then, we discuss common adversarial attacks.
A.1 Ensemble Models
Based on the observation that classifiers can be misled to always decide for a small number of prede-
fined classes through adding perturbations, the work [11] builds an ensemble model that consists of
a generalist classifier (which classifies among all M classes) and a collection of specialists (which
classify among subsets of the classes). The m-th specialist, where m = 0, . . . ,M − 1, classifies
among a subset of the original classes, denoted as Um, within which classm is most often confused
in adversarial examples. The (m +M)-th specialist, where m = 0, . . . ,M − 1, classifies among
a subset Um+M which is complementary to Um, i.e., Um+M = {0, . . . ,M − 1} \ Um. Altogether
there are 2M specialists and one generalist. To classify an input, if there exists a class m such that
the generalist and the M specialists that can classify m all agree that the input belongs to class m,
the prediction is made by averaging the outputs of the generalist and theM specialists. Otherwise,
at least one classifier has misclassified the input, and the prediction is made by averaging the outputs
of all 2M + 1 classifiers in the ensemble.
It has also been observed that the feature input spaces are often unnecessarily large, which leaves
an adversary extensive space to generate adversarial examples. The reference [12] proposes to
“squeeze" out the unnecessary input features. More specifically, [12] trains three independent clas-
sifiers, respectively on three different versions of an image: the original image, the reduced-color
depth version and the spatially smoothed version of the original image. In the testing phase, it com-
pares the softmax probability vectors across these three classifiers’ outputs in terms of L1 distance
and flags the input as adversarial when the highest pairwise L1 distance exceeds a threshold. This
method is mainly used for adversarial detection.
Motivated by studies [33, 34] that show theoretically that promoting diversity among learned fea-
tures of different classes can improve adversarial robustness, the paper [13] trains an ensemble of
multiple base classifiers with an adaptive diversity promoting (ADP) regularizer that encourages di-
versity. The ADP regularizer forces the non-maximal prediction probability vectors, i.e., the vector
containing all prediction probabilities except the maximal one, learned by different base classifiers
to be mutually orthogonal, while keeping the prediction associated with the maximal probability be
consistent across all base classifiers.
Inspired by ECOC, which is mostly used with decision trees or shallow neural networks [15, 16],
the authors in [18] design a DNN using error-correcting codes. It splits the binary classifiers into
several groups and trains them separately. Each classifier is trained on a different task according
to the columns of a predefined code matrix M ∈ RM×N such as a Hadamard matrix with the aim
to increase the diversity of the classifiers so that adversarial examples do not transfer between the
classifiers. To generate final predictions, [18] proposes to map logits to the elements of a codeword
and assigns probability to class k as
pν(k) =
max(m⊺kν(z), 0)∑N−1
i=0 max(m
⊺
kν(z), 0)
,
where ν can be either logistic function ifM takes values in {0, 1} or tanh function ifM takes values
in {−1, 1}, andmk denotes the k-th row ofM.
Studies [35, 36] have suggested that quantized models demonstrate higher robustness to adversar-
ial attacks. The work [14] therefore independently trains multiple models with different levels of
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precision on their weights and activations, and makes final predictions using majority voting. For
example, it uses an ensemble consisting of three models: one full-precision model, i.e., using 32-bit
floating point numbers to represent activations and weights, one model trained with 2-bit activation
and 4-bit weights, and another model with 2-bit activations and 2-bit weights.
Among the aforementioned ensemble methods, we experimentally compare our proposed ECNN
with 1) the ECOC-based DNN proposed in [18] as it shares a similar concept as ours and 2) ADP-
based ensemble method proposed in [13] as it is the only method among the aforementioned ones
that trains the ensemble in an end-to-end fashion. Another reason for choosing these two meth-
ods as baseline benchmarks is their reported classification accuracies under adversarial attacks are
generally better than the other ensemble methods.
A.2 Overview of Adversarial Attacks
For a normal image-label pair (x, y) and a trained DNN fθ with θ being the trainable model parame-
ters, an adversarial attack attempts to find an adversarial example x′ that remains in the Lp-ball with
radius ǫ centered at the normal example x, i.e., ‖x−x′‖p ≤ ǫ, such that fθ(x′) 6= y. In what follows,
we briefly present some popular adversarial attacks that will be used to verify the robustness of our
proposed ECNN.
a) Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [6] perturbs a normal image x in its L∞ neighbor-
hood to obtain
x′ = x+ ǫ · sign (∇xL(fθ(x), y)) ,
where L(fθ(x), y) is the cross-entropy loss of classifying x as label y, ǫ is the perturbation
magnitude, and the update direction at each pixel is determined by the sign of the gradient
evaluated at this pixel. FGSM is a simple yet fast and powerful attack.
b) Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [21] iteratively refines the FGSM by taking multiple
smaller steps α in the direction of the gradient. The refinement at iteration i takes the
following form:
x′i = x
′
i−1 + clipǫ,x (α · sign (∇xL(fθ(x), y))) ,
where x′0 = x and clipǫ,x(x
′) performs per-pixel clipping of the image x′. For example, if
a pixel takes value between 0 and 255, clipǫ,x(x
′) = min {255, x+ ǫ,max{0, x− ǫ, x′}}.
c) Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [22] has the same generation process as BIM except
that PGD starts the gradient descent from a point x′0 chosen uniformly at random in the
L∞-ball of radius ǫ centered at x.
d) Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) [23] is a greedy algorithm that adjusts one
pixel at a time. Given a target class label t 6= y, at each pixel xp,q , where p ∈ {1, . . . , P}
and q ∈ {1, . . . , Q}, of a P ×Q image x, JSMA computes a saliency map:
S(p, q) = −αp,q · βp,q · (αp,q > 0) · (βp,q < 0),
where αp,q =
∂Z(x,t)
∂xp,q
, βp,q =
∑
j 6=t
∂Z(x,j)
∂xp,q
, and Z(x, i) denotes the logit associated with
label i. The logits are the inputs to the softmax function at the output of the DNN classifier.
A bigger value of S(p, q) indicates pixel (p, q) has a bigger impact on mis-labeling x as t.
Let (p∗, q∗) = argmax
p,q
S(p, q) and set the pixel xp∗,q∗ = min (clipmax, xp,q + θ), where
clipmax is a pre-defined clipping value. This process repeats until either the misclassifica-
tion happens or it reaches a pre-defined maximum number of iterations. Note that JSMA is
a targeted attack by design. Its untargeted attack variant selects the target class at random.
e) Carlini & Wagner (C&W) [24]: In this paper, we consider the C&W L2 attack only. Let
x′ = x + 12 (tanh(ω) + 1), where the operations are performed pixel-wise. For a normal
example (x, y), C&W finds the attack perturbation by solving the following optimization
problem
min
ω
∥∥∥∥12(tanh(ω) + 1)− x
∥∥∥∥
2
2
+ c · ℓ
(
1
2
(tanh(ω) + 1)
)
,
where ℓ(x′) = max (Z(x′, y)−max{Z(x′, i) : i 6= y}+ κ, 0). A large confidence param-
eter κ encourages misclassification.
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B Proof for Lemma 1
(a) If θn = θ for all n = 0, . . . , N − 1, we have fn,xk = gθn(xk) = gθ(xk) = f˜xk for some
f˜xk ∈ R
F . We then obtain
φn
[
f˜x0 , . . . , f˜xK−1
]
=
[
zn,x0 , · · · , zn,xK−1
]
, for all n = 0, . . . , N − 1, (11)
where zn,xk denotes the logits associated with the k-th sample and learned by the n-th
binary classifier.
We choose zn,xk be such that the loss of (1) can be made arbitrarily small. Here, we
consider two loss functions:
(a) The cross entropy loss is used in (2). Let ζn,xk be ζn when the input sample is xk .
Suppose we have
ζn,xk =
[
1−max (ε, ξM(y(xk), n))
max (ε, ξM(y(xk), n))
]
,
where ε and ξ are positive constants. Then, the loss of (1) can be made arbi-
trarily small by letting ε → 0 from above and ξ → 1 from below. Since
ζn,xk = [1− σ(zn,xk), σ(zn,xk)]
⊺, this is equivalent to choosing zn,xk =
log
(
max(ε,ξM(y(xk),n))
1−max(ε,ξM(y(xk),n))
)
.
(b) The hinge loss is used in (2). The loss can be made arbitrarily small by choosing zn,xk
be such that sign (2M(y(xk)− 1, n)).
It now suffices to show that with probability one, there exists a φn solving (11) for this
choice of {zn,xk : k = 0, . . . ,K − 1}.
From (4), {f˜xk : k = 0, . . . ,K − 1} are almost surely linearly independent since K ≤ F
and the joint distribution of {ǫn,xk : k = 0, . . . ,K − 1} is absolutely continuous w.r.t.
Lebesgue measure. We thus have
rank
[
f˜x0 · · · f˜xK−1
zn,x0 · · · zn,xK−1
]
= rank
[
f˜x0 · · · f˜xK−1
]
,
i.e., each row in
[
zn,x0 , . . . , zn,xK−1
]
belongs to the row space of
[
f˜x0 , . . . , f˜xK−1
]
. Hence,
there exists a solution φn to (11) for each n. The proof of (a) is now complete.
(b) If φn = φ for all n = 0, . . . , N − 1, we have
φ
[
f0,x0 , . . . , f0,xK−1 , . . . , fN−1,x0 , . . . , fN−1,xK−1
]
=
[
z0,x0 , . . . , zN−1,xK−1
]
. (12)
Since NK ≤ F , a similar argument as the proof of (a) can be applied here to obtain the
claim.
(c) If θn = θ and φn = φ for all n = 0, . . . , N − 1, using the same notations as in the proof
of (a), we have
φ
[
f˜x0 , . . . , f˜xK−1 , . . . , f˜x0 , . . . , f˜xK−1
]
=
[
z0,x0, . . . , zN−1,xK−1
]
, (13)
which implies that φf˜xk = zn,xk holds for all n = 0, . . . , N − 1. This contradicts the fact
that the optimal zn,xk , n = 0, . . . , N − 1, are distinct because the rows in the code matrix
M are designed to be different. The proof of (c) is now complete.
C Proof for Lemma 2
Let zyn = φn(f
y
n) denote the logits associated with class y for the n-th binary classifier.
(a) Using the same construction as in the proof of Lemma 1(a), we choose {zyn} such that the
loss of (1) is arbitrarily small. It suffices to show that there exists φn that satisfy:
φnSn
[
f0, . . . , fM−1
]
=
[
z0n, · · · , z
M−1
n
]
, (14)
for n = 0, . . . , N − 1. A similar argument as that in the proof of Lemma 1 shows this since
Sn is invertible.
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(b) We show the following equations have no solution φ for almost every {fy}M−1y=0 :
φSnf
y = zyn, n = 0, . . . , N − 1. (15)
Similar to the proof technique used in [37, Theorem 5.2], we define a map
G : RFM+F → RNM
(φ⊺, f0, . . . , fM−1) 7→
(
φS0f
0, . . . ,φS0f
M−1, . . . ,φSN−1f
M−1
)
.
It suffices to prove that the image of G has Lebesgue measure 0 in RNM . By Sard’s
theorem, the image of the critical set of G has Lebesgue measure 0 in RNM , where the
critical set ofG is the set of points inRFM+F at which the Jacobian matrix ofG, denoted as
JG ∈ R
NM×(FM+F ), has rank(JG) < NM . Therefore, it suffices to show rank(JG) <
NM for all points in RFM+F . We have
JG =


(f0)⊺S⊺0 φS0 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
(fM−1)⊺S⊺0 0 · · · φS0
(f0)⊺S⊺1 φS1 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
(fM−1)⊺S⊺1 0 · · · φS1
...
...
...
...


.
It can be seen
JG
[
φ,−(f0)⊺, . . . ,−(fM−1)⊺
]⊺
= 0.
Therefore, the columns of JG are linearly dependent and thus rank(JG) < FM + F ≤
NM holds for every point in RFM+F . The proof is now complete if we note that there are
only finitely many permutation matrices.
D Proof for Lemma 3
Consider the model where we set the feature vector fn,x to be f
y(x)
n for all n and x. Using a similar
argument as in the proof of Lemma 1(b), it can be shown that there exists {φn = φ}
N−1
n=0 such that
the loss of (1) is sufficiently small so that zy(xk)n (M(y(xk), n)) > z
y(xk)
n (1−M(y(xk), n)), for all
k = 0, . . . ,K − 1, where zy(xk)n = φ(f
y(xk)
n ). For this choice of φn = φ now applied to the model
in the lemma, we have for each n and xk,
zn,xk = φfn,xk
= φ(fy(xk)n + ǫn,xk)
= zy(xk)n + φǫn,xk ,
so that
sign (zn,xk(0)− zn,xk(1)) = sign
(
zy(xk)n (0)− z
y(xk)
n (1)
)
if
∣∣ǫ⊺n,xk (φ0 − φ1)∣∣ <
∣∣∣zy(xk)n (0)− zy(xk)n (1)∣∣∣, where φ = [φ⊺0 ,φ⊺1 ]⊺. From the Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality,
∣∣ǫ⊺n,xk (φ0 − φ1)∣∣ ≤ ‖ǫn,xk‖2‖φ0 −φ1‖2 and thus zero classification error for the n-th
binary classifier is achievable if ‖ǫn,xk‖2 is sufficiently small. The proof is now complete.
E Proof for Lemma 4
Suppose cross entropy loss is used in (2). The optimization in (6) w.r.t. ζn,xk becomes
min
ζn,xk
1
NK
K−1∑
k=0
N−1∑
n=0
−
(
1yn(xk) − γζn,xk
)⊺
log (ζn,xk) (16)
s.t.
1∑
i=0
ζn,xk(i) = 1,
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where γ > 0.
The Lagrangian of (16) is
L =
1
NK
K−1∑
k=0
N−1∑
n=0
(
−1⊺
yn(xk)
log (ζn,xk) + γζ
⊺
n,xk
log(ζn,xk)
)
−
K−1∑
k=0
N−1∑
n=0
an,k
(
1−
∑
i
ζn,xk(i)
)
,
where an,k ≥ 0, for all n, k. Differentiating L w.r.t. ζn,xk(i) and equating to zero yields
∂L
∂ζn,xk(yn(xk))
= −
1
ζn,xk(yn(xk))
+ γ (log(ζn,xk(yn(xk))) + 1) + an,k = 0,
∂L
∂ζn,xk(i)
= γ (log(1− ζn,xk(yn(xk))) + 1) + an,k = 0, for all i 6= yn(xk).
Equating the above two equations, we have γ log
ζn,xk (yn(xk))
1−ζn,xk (yn(xk))
= 1
ζn,xk(yn(xk))
. This completes
the proof.
F Proof for Lemma 5
We can easily see that s(k, ℓ) = 1
M
if ℓ ∈ Ck; s(k, ℓ) = 0 otherwise. Then, I(y, c) in (10) can be
rewritten as
I(y, c) =
q−1∑
k=0
∣∣Ck∣∣
M
log
1
M
|Ck|
M
1
M
=
q−1∑
k=0
∣∣Ck∣∣
M
log
M
|Ck|
.
The maximum of I(y, c) is achieved when
∣∣Ck∣∣ = M/q, for all k, i.e.,max I(y, c) = log q, which
increases with q. The proof is complete.
G Training q-ary ECNN
We introduce a method to implement a general q-ary ECNN, where q ≥ 2.
G.1 Encoder
The logits, i.e., the encoder’s outputs, in Fig. 1 becomes zn = hn(fn) ∈ Rq . Using a multi-class
hinge loss [24], the encoder can be formulated as an optimization problem:
min
{θn,φn}
N−1
n=0
1
NK
K−1∑
k=0
N−1∑
n=0
max (max{zn,xk(i) : i 6= M(y(xk), n)} − zn,xk(M(y(xk), n)) + κ, 0)
(17)
s.t. for k = 0, . . . ,K − 1 and n = 0, . . . , N − 1,
zn,xk = φngθn(xk),
where M denotes a q-ary code matrix and κ is the confidence level which is configurable. Finally,
the logits zn are concatenated into z =
[
z
⊺
0 , . . . , z
⊺
N−1
]⊺
∈ RqN , which is the input to the decoder
in ECNN.
G.2 Decoder
The decoder maps the logits z to the prediction probabilities p = σ (Mν(z)) ∈ RM , where σ(·)
denotes the softmax function and ν(·) denotes the logistic function.
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G.3 Joint Optimization
The joint optimization for a q-ary ECNN is as follows
min
{θn}
N−1
n=0 ,φ
1
NK
K−1∑
k=0
N−1∑
n=0
max (max{zn,xk(i) : i 6= M(y(xk), n)} − zn,xk(M(y(xk), n)) + κ, 0)
− γζn,xk log (ζn,xk) , (18)
s.t. for n = 0, . . . , N − 1, k = 0, . . . ,K − 1,
zn,xk = φgθn(xk), ζn,xk = σ(zn,xk),
where γ ≥ 0 is a configurable weight.
H Further Experiments
Denote Resi,j , i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2} as the j-th residual unit in the i-th stack. Table 5 shows how the
functions g{1} and g{2}n are constructed using the residual units in ResNet20. The ECNNs used
Table 5: The neural networks for h, g{2}n , g{1}.
g{1} g
{2}
n h
Res0,0 Res2,2 Dense(1, Linear)
· · · Dense(32, ReLu)
Res2,1
to get all our experimental results do not use batch norms (BNs), however, we found that adding
BNs to ECNN will slightly improve ECNN’s classification accuracy on both normal and adversarial
examples.
The PGD attack implemented in Table 3 and Table 4 uses a hinge loss proposed in [24]. The optimal
perturbation δ∗ is thus found by solving
min
δ
−max(sx+δ(y(x + δ))−max{sx+δ(i) : i 6= y(x)} + c, 0) ,
where s denotes the logits from the decoder and c = 50.
H.1 Number of Ensemble Members in ECNN
For a 10-label classification problem, representing labels with unique codewords requires N ≥
4. In this experiment, we independently generate five code matrices for N = 10, 15, 20, 25, 30,
respectively, and use them to construct five ECNNs. The settings of adversarial attacks are the same
as Table 4. Table 6 shows that when N is small, ECNN has inferior performances on adversarial
examples. One possible reason is that we use a dense layer with the same feature dimension F = 32
for all N in our experiments. From Lemma 2, we know that when F ≫ N , it may happen that the
features fy(x)n for different binary classifiers n = 0, . . . , N−1 are permutations of each other for the
same sample x. Adversarial attacks on a particular binary classifier can then translate to the other
classifiers.
H.2 Parameter Sharing
As shown in Table 5, ECNN performs parameter sharing among binary classifiers at both ends of
the encoder. Sharing g{1} is inspired by the idea from transfer learning [38] which says the features
are transferable between neural networks when they are performing similar tasks. Due to Lemma 2,
sharing h is to avoid the features extracted from different binary classifiers to be permutations of
each other for the same sample x.
Define |g{1}| as the number of trainable parameters in g{1} and define |g{2}n |, n = 0, . . . , N − 1 and
|h| analogously. The total number of trainable parameters in ECNN can be computed as |g{1}| +
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Table 6: Classification accuracy (%) on adversarial CIFAR10 examples using ECNNN0.1 whereN =
10, 15, 20, 25, 30.
Attack Para. N = 10 N = 15 N = 20 N = 25 N = 30
None - 84.6 85.5 85.1 85.5 85.1
PGD ǫ = 0.04 41.2 49.9 50.2 48.5 71.6
C&W - 72.0 71.4 74.1 71.8 80.8
# of trainable params - 294,977 343,857 392,737 441,617 490,497
∑N−1
n=0 |g
{2}
n |+ |h|. If |g{1}|+ |h| is much larger than any |g
{2}
n |, the growth of the total number of
parameters in ECNN whenN increases will be very slow. Table 7 shows that performing parameter
sharing yields better classification accuracy on clean and adversarial examples than the one with no
parameter sharing, i.e., each binary classifier is a composite function hn ◦g
{2}
n ◦g
{1}
n . This is mainly
because the latter which contains too many parameters overfits the data.
Table 7: Classification accuracy (%) on adversarial CIFAR10 examples using ECNN300.1 with and
without parameter sharing.
Attack Para. w/ para. share w/o para. share
None - 85.1 79.2
PGD ǫ = 0.04 71.6 51.1
C&W - 80.8 73.2
# of trainable params - 490,497 8,194,590
H.3 Code Matrix
In this experiment, we investigate the impact of code matrix design on ECNN’s performance. To
highlight the benefit of optimizing both row and column distances, we construct a code matrix
M′ = [Ma,1−Ma] of size 10×30whereMa is of size 10×15 and is the first 15 columns extracted
from the code matrix generated by optimizing (9). M′’s minimumVI distance between columns is 0
while its minimum Hamming distance between rows remains large. As shown in Table 8, the ECNN
trained on M′ has worse testing accuracy on adversarial examples so that optimizing both row and
column distance is advised in practice.
Table 8: Classification accuracy (%) on adversarial CIFAR10 examples with a codematrix whose
minimum VI distance between columns is 0.
Attack Para. M M′
None - 85.1 84.0
PGD ǫ = 0.04 71.6 31.1
C&W - 80.8 56.0
H.4 Fine-tuning C&W Attack and Logits Level Attack Using PGD
Reference [39] reports that ECOC-based DNN, i.e., TanhEns16, proposed in [18] is vulnerable to
the white-box attacks when they are carried out properly. So, we test our ECNN’s robustness under
the fine-tuning C&W attack suggested in [39] and PGD attack which works on the logits level from
the encoder, i.e., zn, n = 0, . . . , N − 1. For PGD attack, the hinge loss [24] is used as the attack
loss function. We use q-ary ECNN introduced in Appendix G as the training model. Table 9 shows
that both attacks are not very successful to fool q-ary ECNN with q = 2, 3, 4. One reason could be
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that we use the multi-class hinge loss proposed in [24] as the loss function during training which
counteracts these two attacks as they are also using this hinge loss as their attack loss functions.
Moreover, we suspect that the attack parameters and/or loss functions for these two attacks are not
optimized. So, as a future work, we will test ECNN using more effective attacks.
Table 9: Classification accuracy (%) on adversarial CIFAR10 examples crafted by the fine-tuning
C&W attack suggested in [39] and PGD attack working on logits zn, n = 0, . . . , N − 1 at the
encoder’s outputs using q-ary ECNN300.1 where q = 2, 3, 4. We set the confidence level κ = 1 in
(18).
Attack Para. q = 2 q = 3 q = 4
None - 85.0 84.4 84.3
Fine-tuning C&W [39]
initial constant= 0.1
max iteration = 2000 81.5 82.5 82.0
confidence κ = 0
PGD on logits zn ǫ = 0.04 79.1 80.2 80.4
# of trainable params - 490,530 490,563 490,596
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